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Abstract 
 
Since the 1960s, African states have embraced regional integration as a vital 
mechanism for political cooperation and for pooling resources to overcome problems of 
small and fragmented economies. In building meaningful institutions for regionalism, 
however, Africans have faced the challenges of reconciling the diversities of culture, 
geography, and politics. As a result, African regional institutions are characterized by 
multiple and competing mandates and weak institutionalization. This study illustrates 
these themes by comparing two continental institutions—the African Union and its 
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa and subregional institutions—the Economic Commission of 
Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Common 
Market for East and Southern African States, the Community of the Sahel-Saharan 
States, and the Arab Maghreb Union. By focusing on the institutional structures, 
mandates, and contributions of these organizations in their geographical domains, the 
study probes the links between policy articulation and outcomes.  The conclusion 
focuses on lessons that African regionalism can inform Asian integration experiences. 
 
 
Keywords: African Regionalism, Regional Integration, Africa, African Union, United 
Nation’s Economic Commission for Africa  
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1. Introduction 
 
Regional integration has been a dominant process in African efforts to build multilateral 
institutions for development and security through economic cooperation and political 
coordination. In a system of multiple states that have adhered to territorial boundaries 
and national sovereignty, integration has been perceived as a compromise between 
nationalism and supra-nationalism. Since the 1960s, African countries have invoked the 
importance of forging close economic cooperation to enhance growth and development, 
overcome the impediments of political fragmentation, and increase Africa’s 
competitiveness with the rest of the world. In trying to attain these objectives, African 
states have engaged in the construction of continental and subregional mechanisms for 
integration. Most of these efforts have entailed reconciling national and regional priorities 
against the backdrop of competing demands and expectations. Despite the broad 
consensus on the benefits of integration, there has been a mixed record of national 
commitment to regional institutions. Myriad developmental challenges accompanying 
state- and nation-building processes have stymied regional initiatives, saddling most of 
Africa with weak integration arrangements. Equally significant, attempts to build regional 
integration schemes in Africa have oscillated between subregional and continental 
domains, raising profound questions about the geographical reach of regionalism. Often 
regarded as the differences between minimalist and maximalist approaches to 
integration, these contrasting visions have framed the tenor and debates about 
integration schemes. Over the years, nonetheless, there has emerged a tenuous 
compromise to deepen integration at both the subregional and continental levels. 
 
This study seeks to contribute toward understanding the evolution and performance of 
regionalism in Africa through an analysis of core continental institutions—the African 
Union (AU) and United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA)—and   
subregional institutions—the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market of Southern 
and Eastern African States (COMESA), Community of Sahelian and Saharan States 
(CEN–SAD), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).  Since these institutions constitute some 
of the anchors of African regionalism, it is important to understand their evolution, 
institutional design, and performance.  Framed within a historical perspective dating 
back to the 1960s, the analysis probes the main actors, events, and processes that have 
animated African integration and also highlights the roles of key external actors in 
promoting regionalism in Africa. The conclusion reflects on what the African integration 
experience might portend for integration in Asia. 
 
 
2.  Continentalism and Sub-Regionalism in African 
Regionalism 
 
Most studies of regionalism make a distinction between regional cooperation and 
integration to differentiate between process and outcomes.  Regional cooperation is a 
more flexible form of regionalism, denoting the coordination and coalescence of policies 
around common objectives. Regional integration, on the other hand, is perceived as a 
more weighty process of ceding sovereignty to new structures that acquire substantive 2       |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 85 
roles beyond cooperation (Haas 1970; Asante 1997). From this perspective, cooperation 
may be a process of attaining the ends of integration, a terminal stage where states 
cede some of the factual attributes of sovereignty. Economic analyses of the progressive 
stages of integration also mirror the dynamic evolution from limited cooperation 
arrangements in the trade arena to substantive forms of economic integration. The 
classical characterization of integration identifies five stages: (i) preferential trade area 
(PTA), (ii) free trade area (FTA), (iii)  customs union, (iv) common market, and (v) 
economic union (Viner 1950; Hansen 1969). Throughout these stages, increased trade 
and market cooperation builds the foundations for substantive integration.  In the 
penultimate stage of economic union, states may lose autonomy and sovereignty over 
economic policy. 
 
African attempts at integration have operated within the overarching framework of 
incrementally accelerating the capacity for shared sovereignties and problem-solving in 
the economic and political realms.  But attaining these objectives has been difficult, 
primarily because of the problems of translating lofty ideals into realities and the array of 
challenges associated with managing Africa’s economic, political, and geographical 
diversities. As Mshomba has succinctly noted: “Part of what makes economic integration 
in Africa an interesting subject for research…is the wide gap between the rhetorical 
support of politicians and the real state of economic integration” (Mshomba 2000,175). 
Another critic also states that: “African integration ideals have been based on lofty 
transcontinental ambitions, evocative political slogans, a plethora of treaties and regional 
institutions, high-minded principles, and protectionist proclivities” (Mistry 2000, 554). 
 
Since colonial times, authors of integration schemes in Africa have attempted to 
overcome the deficiencies of fragile and fragmented economies and polities, redoing the 
territorial and political tapestry established in the partition of Africa. Questions of 
economies of scale and political viability have always dominated integration 
arrangements, reflecting a yearning for political and economic communities that 
transcend existing structures (Green and Seidman 1968; Hazelwood 1967). Initial 
regional economic integration schemes were crafted by colonial powers seeking to 
create large unions among geographically diverse entities. Some of these efforts 
involved the economic rationalization of colonial territories to foster trade and 
infrastructural cooperation.  One of the largest colonial initiative was the French bid to 
group 13 territories into two federations: (i) French West Africa (Afrique Occidental 
Francaise [AOF]) comprising made up of Cote d’Ivoire, Dahomey, French Guinea, 
French Soudan, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta; and (ii) French Equatorial 
African Federation (Afrique Equatorial Francaise [AEF]) comprising Chad, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Gabon, and Cameroon. Although each federation had its own 
currency and possessed the potential for political and economic development, France 
abandoned this scheme in 1958. Similarly, the East African Common Market 
Organization (EACMO) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) were colonial 
bids to exploit geographical proximities to lay the foundations of trade, monetary, 
industrial, and infrastructural cooperation (Mugomba 1978; Robson 1985; Johnson 
1991). 
 
On the eve of decolonization in the late 1950s, the process of integration unleashed in 
Europe through the Treaty of Rome in 1957 influenced the trajectory of Africa’s Institution Building for African Regionalism     |       3 
regionalism. While spearheading the formation of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), France also induced its European partners to provide aid, technical assistance, 
and trade preferences to its former colonies under the rubric of the Yaounde 
Agreements of 1963 and 1969. Alongside these agreements, France galvanized 
initiatives among its former colonies for the formation of new regional blocs such as the 
Union Douaniere de L’Afrique de l’Quest (UDEAO) and the Union Africaine et Malgache 
de Cooperation Economique (OCAM) (Roland 1967).  But the most significant outcome 
of the Yaounde agreements was that they were broadened to form the basis for much 
larger Europe–Africa relations, whose core objective was to help deepen integration in 
Africa through strengthening trade and aid relationships under the Lomé Conventions of 
the 1970s. 
 
Equally vital, French-led regionalism in the post-independence period gave rise to a 
countervailing movement led primarily by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s 
Sekou Toure for indigenous approaches to African integration. Invoking Pan-Africanist 
ideals, Nkrumah opposed the association of African countries with the EEC on the 
grounds that it would impede continental integration. Instead Nkrumah proposed a grand 
Continental Union Government that would reduce colonial fragmentation, promote 
political union by diminishing sovereignty, and facilitate economic development.  Ranged 
against this vision was the gradualist approach articulated notably by most of the 
Francophone countries, but also by Tanzania and Nigeria, which suggested basing 
Africa’s integration schemes on subregional organizations. This perspective envisaged 
economic integration beginning at the subregional levels and proceeding in stages, 
beginning with functional cooperation and coordination, and eventually leading toward a 
common market (Legum 1967; Tevoedjre 1965). 
 
2.1  From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union  
 
The contest between continentalism and subregionalism was resolved by the formation 
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 when African states opted for both 
continental institutions for security and political integration based on respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity coexisting alongside subregional economic 
institutions and arrangements. The key founders of the OAU were all inspired by the 
Pan-Africanist ideals of promoting cooperation through unity and political coordination. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis placed on unity allowed the evolution of norms and 
principles that were to underpin a collective security system in Africa. Central to these 
principles were the notions of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, the fight for the 
decolonization of Africa, and common African voices and positions in the international 
arena. These principles helped to lend a measure of stability to Africa and galvanized 
continental efforts for self-determination and independence (Amate 1986). 
 
The idea of continentalism that was captured in the OAU pervaded the first decades of 
the post-colonial era because most of the security threats to African states emanated 
from neighbouring countries and subregions.  At this time, African countries defined 
security primarily in terms of the absence of threats to the principles of sovereignty, 
physical components of territory, and the consolidation of statehood. Although border 
wars and subversive activities occurred in the Horn of Africa and some parts of North 
and West Africa, the OAU’s system of interstate norms and practices laid the solid 4       |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 85 
foundation that permitted most African states to consolidate their independence and 
strengthen internal dimensions of statehood and nationhood (Zartman 1967). In addition, 
through international and regional bodies, the OAU also played a significant role in 
mobilizing against minority regimes in Southern Africa, a process that was concluded in 
the 1990s.  In the economic realm, as will be discussed below, the OAU in collaboration 
with the UNECA made some efforts, through the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the 
Abuja Treaty of 1991, to start dialogue on continental economic integration using 
subregional organizations. 
 
By the 1980s, continental institutions had produced remarkable stability among the 
African state system, defying those who had conjured up images of the disintegration of 
colonially-created states. Despite the OAU’s record in forging a collective security 
system for Africa, the assumptions underlying continental institution-building faced 
challenges from internal pressures within African states. The OAU had evolved 
mechanisms for dealing with external sources of threats to territory, but not internal 
convulsions within its member states. Thus, the centrifugal forces of ethnicity and 
regionalism wrought the civil wars, political instability, and state collapse that were to 
characterize the African security landscape starting in the late 1980s.  Internal strains 
also coincided with the global forces that propelled democracy, participation, 
accountability, and good governance to the forefront of African politics and security. 
 
The coalescence of internal and external pressures forced a re-evaluation of the 
continental institutions tasked with managing the new strains and challenges. Given the 
increasing dissatisfaction with the OAU’s role in responding to Africa’s emerging threats, 
there were new initiatives by African leaders in civil society organization to evolve novel 
institutions that would balance the problems of democracy, security, stability, and 
economic development. At the center of these efforts was the African Leadership Forum 
(ALF) organized under the direction of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to 
reform OAU principles to reflect changing needs and priorities. In the early 1990s, the 
ALF articulated ambitious proposals under the rubric of the Conference on Security, 
Stability, and Development Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) that would guide future 
continental institution-building (Zartman and Deng 2002). The escalation of civil wars in 
Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone strengthened the momentum for institutional reforms 
to boost African capacity for intervention in internal conflicts. Initial attempts at reforms 
culminated in the 1993 OAU Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, and 
Resolution that were adopted in Cairo to give the Secretariat more power to manage 
problems related to weak and collapsing states.  Although reflecting the spirit of the 
CSSDCA, the new mechanisms were inadequate in saving the OAU from obsolescence, 
particularly since subregional institutions were also beginning to take greater roles in the 
security arena (Touray 2005). 
 
Libya under Muammar Gaddaffi provided leadership in the transformation of the OAU 
into the AU. In a September 1999 summit of African leaders in Sirte, Libya, Gaddaffi 
suggested the establishment of the United States of Africa—with executive, judicial, and 
legislative powers—to replace the OAU by January 2000.  But this bold move caught his 
colleagues off guard and ignited a renewed determination to find a compromise position. 
As Khamis notes: 
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After long and arduous discussion among African leaders, consensus emerged 
that conditions might not be favorable right away for the establishment of the 
United States of Africa owing to the prevailing situation in which the continent 
found itself. However, since the OAU had also not been very effective in 
achieving intended objectives, it was high time that Africa embarked on a 
transformation towards stronger unity. It was on such grounds that African 
leaders finally adopted the Sirte declaration, which approved the transformation 
of the Organization of African Unity into an African Union (Khamis 2008, 94). 
 
The Sirte declaration was the precursor to long-drawn negotiations among African 
leaders about the institutions that would undergird the AU.  These negotiations were 
reminiscent of the debate between the continentalists and subregionalists, pitting Libya 
and its allies, who pushed for a union with more elaborate powers, against Nigeria and 
South Africa, who were more cautious about a stronger continental body.  Following 
3  years of deliberations, African leaders approved the Constitutive Act of the AU in 
Durban, South Africa in July 2002. 
 
The Sirte declaration was the precursor to long-drawn negotiations among African 
leaders about the institutions that would undergird the AU.  These negotiations were 
reminiscent of the debate between the continentalists and subregionalists, pitting Libya 
and its allies, who pushed for a union with more elaborate powers, against Nigeria and 
South Africa, who were more cautious about a stronger continental body.  Following 
3  years of deliberations, African leaders approved the Constitutive Act of the AU in 
Durban, South Africa in July 2002. 
 
Apart from the PSC, the AU has created myriad institutions to strengthen its institutional 
capacity and boost its reach across Africa.  The AU Commission is the main 
administrative organ of the AU that designs, implements, and executes its peace-
building and preventive activities. The Commission is composed of a chairperson, a 
deputy chairperson, and eight commissioners. The Commissioner for Peace and 
Security is responsible for the implementation of PSC decisions. Guiding the peace and 
security agenda of the AU Commission is the Common African Defense and Security 
Policy (CADSP) that embraces the traditional focus on state security as well as new 
human security dimensions such as poverty, human rights, and gender equality. An 
equally innovative component of the peace and security architecture is the African 
Standby Force (ASF), which has been conceived to intervene to stem conflicts and 
provide an indigenous peacekeeping structure in Africa.  The ASF is comprised of 
regionally-based stand-by brigades and was projected to be operational by June 2010 
(Okumu 2009; Franke 2007; Powell and Tieku 2005; Kioko 2003; Williams 2007).  
 
To lend a participatory flavor to the AU, its framers came up with new institutions such 
as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council 
(ECOSSC); the African Court of Justice; and the Panel of the Wise. Consistent with the 
long-term objective of helping to foster African economic integration, the AU Constitutive 
Act pledged to build on the previous Abuja Treaty to use subregional organizations for 
the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC). Also underscoring Africa’s 
determination for development and integration, the continental strategic framework and 
vision for Africa’s renewal, the New Partnership for African Economic Development 6       |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 85 
(NEPAD), sees subregional organizations as the fundamental building blocks needed to 
achieve its multifaceted objectives. 
 
Since its formation in 2002, the AU has focused on managing various conflicts in 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Somali, 
Sudan, and Togo. By sending peacekeeping missions to Burundi and Darfur, and 
intervening to restore constitutional legality in Comoros, the AU gradually began to learn 
the difficult roles of conflict prevention, management, and resolution.  With its 
intervention capacity limited by resources, the AU has had to depend throughout these 
engagements on supportive international actors, particularly the UN, the European 
Union (EU), and bilateral donors (Powell and Tieku 2005; Kioko 2003).   
 
As it has tried to refurbish its conflict management capacity and increase its visibility 
throughout Africa, the AU has also confronted enormous pressures from Libyan leader 
Gaddaffi, who has never relented in his grandiose scheme for a United States of Africa.  
Since 2005, Gaddaffi has mobilized key African allies for a renewed push to form a 
Union Government in Africa that would replace the existing AU structures. After several 
painstaking attempts by Gaddaffi to fast-track the Union Government, the AU Summit in 
July 2009 compromised on transforming the current AU Commission into an AU 
Authority led by a President with the enhanced powers of coordinating foreign, trade, 
and defence policies. The Authority would not come into force until the 53 member 
states ratify an amendment to the AU Constitutive Act. It is envisaged that member 
states would have 6 years to consult their domestic constituencies in reaching decisions 
on ratification. Coming barely 7 years since the formation of the AU, the hasty process of 
creating new structures has polarized Africa and caused considerable consternation 
among African allies about the seriousness of some leaders in developing a consistent 
path to institution-building. As Botswana’s Vice President remarked after the July 2009 
decision: “The Chair [Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddaffi] has no respect for established 
procedures and processes of the African Union because he is motivated by his burning 
desire to coerce everyone into the premature establishment of an African Union 
Government.The AU needs to get its priorities right if the hope of functional unity among 
African countries is to be kept alive” (Allafrica News 2009b). 
 
The transformations occasioned by popular uprisings in North Africa that started in 
January 2011 are bound to have a significant impact on the future of the AU. Long 
immune to the pressures for democratization and pluralism, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 
have witnessed the overthrow of leaders who dominated politics for decades. These 
changes have also sparked protests and riots in Sub-Saharan African states where 
opposition groups feel marginalized from power. More critical, with the raging civil war 
and external military engagement against Libya’s Gaddaffi, it is unlikely that Libya will 
continue to occupy the dominant role in the AU as envisioned by Gaddaffi. In fact, 
Gaddaffi’s demise may force the AU to return to the incremental process of building 
continental institutions along the modest lines established by the Constitutive Act. 
Uncertainties, however, abound about whether African countries will be able to replace 
the 50% contributions from North African countries to the AU budget, particularly if the 
new generation of North African leaders becomes less committed to Pan-Africanist 
ideals (O’Neil 2011). Institution Building for African Regionalism     |       7 
2.2  The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
 
Established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1958, 
the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has been a critical institution in the 
articulation of ideas on regionalism and the implementation of the mandates of regional 
institutions.  Its comparative advantage arises from the fact that it is the only UN agency 
with the responsibility to “operate at the regional and subregional levels to harness 
resources and bring them to bear on Africa's priorities” (UNECA 1958). Its strategic 
location in Addis Ababa, which is the OAU and AU headquarters, also afforded it a 
unique opportunity to influence thinking on the trajectories of Africa regional integration 
schemes. The UNECA also has five subregional offices in Africa that have contributed 
to its other mandates of analysis and advocacy, enhancing partnerships, technical 
assistance, and communication and knowledge sharing (UNECA 1958).    
 
In the early 1960s, at the height of the formative debates about the structure of regional 
institutions, the UNECA was at the forefront of generating knowledge that was useful for 
African integration. At the OAU Heads of States conference in 1963, the UNECA 
suggested a programmatic and realistic approach to integration in Africa: 
 
There are two main forms which an integration scheme can take. It may either be 
intended to solve certain specific problems and perhaps lead to increasingly 
intense and intimate cooperation. Or else it may aim from the beginning at the 
creation of an economic union, where labor and capital will be free to move as 
well as goods, and where the economic and social policies of member 
governments will be harmonized to a high degree. Integration of the first kind 
starts by building up habits of cooperation; integration of the second kind starts 
by creating the forms of highly intense cooperation. Under African conditions, an 
integration scheme of the first type would seem especially important. Certainly it 
seems that the economic background is not yet ripe for a full economic union, 
quite apart from the political obstacles. An economic union presupposes a high 
degree of economic interdependence among the countries concerned, which can 
be conveniently measured by the ratio of their mutual trade to their total trade. 
The main purpose of an integration scheme in Africa at this stage would be to 
pave the way for fuller economic union later, that is, to create conditions which 
would lead to a growing interdependence of African countries and lessen their 
dependence on those outside the region, in the context of accelerated 
development (UNECA 1963a, 397–98). 
 
Although proposing “large-scale import substitution based on larger, sub-regional 
markets,” the UNECA pointed to the major obstacles to integration in Africa: 
 
For obvious reasons, the desire for national planning in countries that have only 
recently acceded to independence tends to be very strong; besides, due to the 
poor state of intra-Africa communications in the past, African countries have had 
little opportunity to learn about each other. Moreover, while markets have to be 
widened, it must not be forgotten that at the same time the national markets of 
African countries are also in need of internal integration; in many cases, a true 
national market has still to be created (UNECA 1963a, 398). 8       |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 85 
The gradualist vision articulated by the UNECA shaped the course of African integration 
in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the proliferation of subregional institutions such as 
the East African Community (EAC), Economic Commission of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Economic Community of West Africa (Communite Economique de l’Afrique 
de l’Quest [CEAO]), Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), Preferential Trade Area (PTA), Mano River Union (MRU), 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (Communite Economique des Pays 
des Grand Lacs [CEPGL]), and the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). Thus, by the mid-1980s, Africa had realized the UNECA’s 
gradualist vision of subregional entities as the bedrock of integration.  
 
But amidst disappointing economic performance throughout Africa, the UNECA and the 
OAU came up with a blueprint for Africa’s self-reliance and industrialization geared 
toward domestic markets. The Lagos Plan of Action passed by the OAU in 1980 made 
the creation of regional organizations the centerpiece of the grand strategy for self-
reliant development.  The Plan acknowledged that, given the small size of African 
domestic markets, regional organizations would enlarge market size via the protection of 
infant industries and the attraction of foreign direct investment (OAU 1980).
  
 
Consistent with the idea expressed since the early 1960s, the UNECA continued to 
advocate for economic collaboration among states that essentially adhered to their 
sovereignty.  Such integration would entail a common external tariff; the free movement 
of peoples and goods; and the coordination of macro-economic policies to ensure 
mutual consistency among fiscal, monetary, external payments, and exchange rate 
policies of member states.  As part of the Lagos Plan of Action, the ECA envisioned 
broadening the then existing regional institutions to create the foundational blocks for the 
African Economic Community (AEC) (UNECA 1984; Onwuka and Sesay 1985). 
 
Although since the mid-1960s the UNECA had advised the OAU on modalities for 
establishing the AEC, the Lagos Plan of Action was the most comprehensive treatment 
on this subject (Khamis 2008).  While critics questioned the effectiveness of regional 
integration in Africa, the UNECA and OAU moved quickly from the mid-1980s toward 
reinvigoration of the idea of an AEC.  Drawing from the Lagos Plan of Action, the 
UNECA and OAU convened a series of exploratory meetings toward the formation of a 
continental economic community. These initiatives culminated in the Abuja Treaty of 
1991 that gave further elaboration to the gradual establishment of an AEC as an integral 
part of the OAU.  According to its framers, the AEC would be established over a 34-year 
period through coordination, harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities 
of the existing regional economic communities. The Abuja Treaty also envisaged the 
creation of regional institutions in subregions that did not have them, particularly in North 
Africa.  Article 8(3) of the Treaty conferred on the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, the supreme organ of the AEC, the power to “give directives, coordinate, 
and harmonize the economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and social policies of member 
states” (OAU 1991,5).  Throughout the 1990s, there were efforts to implement the initial 
stages of the AEC, including the creation of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) as the organ to implement the AEC, the establishment of an AEC Secretariat, Institution Building for African Regionalism     |       9 
and the strengthening of relations between the AEC Secretariat and subregional 
institutions.  But as Khamis reveals, these efforts were impeded by numerous obstacles: 
 
Member states failed to strictly adhere to the agreed treaties, protocols, and rules, 
including meeting their financial obligations in their respective groupings and, as 
a result, the groupings too were affected.  Out of the five regional economic 
groupings identified to be pillars of the community, only three—ECOWAS, 
COMESA, and SADC—were relatively active. ECCAS was inoperative due both 
to financial and administrative problems.  Its policy organs were not meeting 
regularly and member states were not making their financial contributions. Union 
du Maghreb arabe (UMA) was not interested in taking part in the community 
activities because one of its members, Morocco, was no longer a member of the 
Organization of African Unity. . .Under such circumstances, there came to be 
recognized not only the difficulty to realize the African Economic Community but 
all other fundamental objectives as well. Consequently, the African leaders came 
to see merit in a proposal to establish an African Union (AU) and supported it as 
an alternative option that might review the whole strategy of implementing the 
community to advance the integration and unity of the African continent (Khamis 
2008, 64–65). 
 
With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, the ideas embedded in the Abuja Treaty 
for the AEC have remained constant. The AU Constitutive Act has committed itself to 
establish mechanisms for the coordination and harmonization of policies and activities 
among the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that would accelerate the 
establishment of the African Common Market as a prelude to the AEC. A protocol signed 
between the AU and RECs in Addis Ababa in June 2004 establishes sectoral 
benchmarks for the gradual formation of the African Free Trade Area (FTA), Common 
Market, and Monetary Union over a 10-year period.  While the role of the UNECA in the 
formation of the AU institutions was not as visible as in previous years, it continues to 
play a significant role in working closely with the major RECs to harmonize membership, 
strengthen policies, and build technical capacity to pursue regional integration.  In a 
recent innovative program, the UNECA in collaboration with NEPAD set up an 
Observatory on Regional Integration in Africa, a primary source of information to assist 
policy makers, RECs, and other stakeholders with relevant information on current 
progress, challenges, and issues related to regional integration in Africa (UNECA 2008). 
 
 
3.  Regional Economic Communities: Comparative 
Experiences 
 
African subregions have been the incubators for diverse experiments in integration that 
proceeded from geographical contiguities, cultural similarities, and shared interests. 
Early proponents of subregional arrangements such as Tanzania and Nigeria saw 
subregions as the logical framework for integration because the grandiose continentalist 
vision failed to capture Africa’s historical and cultural distinctiveness, which would 
always stand in the way of meaningful integration. Instead, they advocated for 
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convergence around the objectives of integration and where, for the most part, colonial 
regimes had created the semblance of integration infrastructure. When the OAU was 
formed, proponents of subregionalism perceived it as furnishing the larger umbrella for 
the advancement of broad ideals of unity, self-determination, and security, while the 
subregional institutions became the critical locus for economic cooperation, including 
FTAs, customs unions, and common markets. Over the years, however, RECs 
broadened their mandates to include security, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping— 
roles that were previously the domain of continental institutions.  Similarly, starting in the 
1980s, the OAU and AU, through their mandates, expected that subregional 
organizations would form the preliminary, albeit primary, institutions toward the 
realization of the goal of the AEC. 
 
This section reviews the experiences of some African RECs toward the goals of 
integration, highlighting the key opportunities and challenges. In examining their 
historical backgrounds, institutional mandates, and performance, the analysis provides a 
comparison of the distinctive patterns and processes that characterize various regions. 
 
3.1  The Economic Community of Central African States 
 
Background 
The history of regional integration in Central Africa can be traced back to the colonial era 
when the French government established the Union of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique 
Equatoriale Française [AEF]) to ease the administration of the region.  Comprising the 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Chad, the AEF sought to 
harmonize financial, economic, and transport policies, as well as to coordinate 
interactions with the French metropolis. The AEF was dissolved in 1959 on the eve of 
independence, leading to the establishment of the Equatorial Customs Union (Union 
Douanière Equatoriale [UDE]). In 1964, UDE was transformed into the Customs and 
Economic Union of Central Africa (Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale, 
UDEAC) and its membership incorporated Cameroon. In 1985, Equatorial Guinea joined 
UDEAC. Designed to promote intra-regional trade among Central African countries, 
UDEAC is the oldest of all integration bodies in Africa. It was initially conceived to be a 
customs union through the adoption of a common external tariff (CET). In 1994, UDEAC 
was restructured and renamed CEMAC to address the challenges emanating from 
excessive protection, low customs revenue, intra-regional distortions in production, and 
the low levels of trade with the rest of the world. The CEMAC treaty entered into force in 
June 1999.  
 
Apart from UDEAC, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) 
was established in Central Africa in the mid-1970s comprising Burundi, Rwanda, and 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).  Efforts to merge the CEPGL and 
UDEAC failed. In the early 1980s, building on the momentum generated by the Lagos 
Plan of Action for continental integration, Gabon led initiatives to establish a more 
comprehensive regional institution that became the Economic Community of Central 
African States  (ECCAS).  Its members were made up of CEMAC and CEPGL 
participants plus Angola, São Tomé and Principe, and Equatorial Guinea. In October 
1983, as part of the implementation of continental initiatives, ECCAS members signed a 
treaty to establish the institution in Libreville, Gabon (Awoumou 2008).  Currently, Institution Building for African Regionalism     |       11 
ECCAS has 11 members, including Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe. 
 
From the outset, ECCAS faced problems typical of most African regional institutions, 
notably the competitive and duplicative nature of regional integration.  The multiplicity of 
regional integration institutions is seen in the fact that most of the members of ECCAS 
are also members of CEMAC and CEPGL: Angola and the DRC are members of 
ECCAS and SADC; Burundi and Rwanda are members of ECCAS, CEPGL, and the 
EAC. These institutional overlaps have limited the capacity of established institutions to 
foster collective efforts toward effective harmonization and integration (Gankou and Ntah 
2008).  More critically, even though ECCAS is the largest regional institution in Central 
Africa, CEMAC with only six member countries, has advanced further toward regional 
integration because it has established more effective institutions such as coordinated 
and preferential trade reforms; a common currency zone known as the Communuate 
Financier de l’Afrique (CFA); a regional central bank; and a regional development bank 
(Gankou and Ntah 2008). Paradoxically, the AU has recognized ECCAS, rather than 
CEMAC, as the foundation for the AEC in Central Africa.  
 
Objectives and Mandates 
The overriding mandate of ECCAS is to promote regional economic cooperation and to 
ultimately establish a Central African Common Market.  ECCAS has set out the following 
priorities: 
 
(i)  development of the capacities to maintain peace, security, and stability as the  
prerequisite for economic and social development;  
(ii) development of physical, economic, and monetary integration;  
(iii) development of a culture of human integration; and  
(iv)  establishment of an autonomous financing mechanism for the region (ECCAS 
1983, 3). 
 
To realize these objectives, ECCAS has promoted policy reforms, including the 
removal of restrictive trade practices, streamlining of customs procedures, increased 
surveillance of macroeconomic policies, and greater fiscal discipline.  In addition, several 
of the key ECCAS mandates include promoting harmonious cooperation and self-
sustained development, and gradually eliminating obstacles between member states to 
the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital.  In recognition of the many 
landlocked states in the region, the ECCAS treaty gives prominence to the rapid 
development of landlocked states, island states, and semi-landlocked states. Over the 
years as conflicts have proliferated in Central Africa, ECCAS has added the mandate of 
promotion of peace and security. Like most African regional organizations, the ECCAS 
treaty puts more emphasis on economic cooperation than mainstream integration. This 
approach is consistent with the traditional linear pattern of integration that proceeds from 
FTAs, common markets, and economic unions (ECCAS 1983).  
 
ECCAS Institutions 
ECCAS has placed emphasis on an intergovernmental cooperation framework, with 
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The significance accorded to state sovereignty is reflected in the institutional 
arrangements that give prominence to heads of state of member countries. The core 
institutions of ECCAS are the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Council of 
Ministers, Court of Justice, General Secretariat, Consultative Committee, and 
Specialized Technical Committees.  As the main decision-making body, the Authority 
has extensive powers that include the final approval of all policy matters recommended 
by the Council (ECCAS 1983). Given that the Authority is vested with the power to 
overturn or reject policy proposals, the decisions of the Council and other institutions are 
severely curtailed.  Operationally, there are infrequent meetings of the Authority and the 




During the first 8 years of its existence, ECCAS adopted a trade liberalization program 
that was to be implemented gradually, starting with tariff reductions and the elimination 
of non-tariff barriers to intra-ECCAS trade.  However, not much progress has been made 
in implementing any element of this trade liberalization program. Throughout the 1990s, 
ECCAS suffered from a period of inactivity because of armed conflicts in most member 
states, the absence of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention and management, 
and the low level of commitment among members (Awoumou 2008). To reverse this 
trend, the UNECA took the lead in 1998 to revive ECCAS by providing technical 
assistance to establish an autonomous financing mechanism and an FTA.  At a summit 
in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in 1999, ECCAS adopted a recovery and revitalization 
program based on the development of physical, economic, and monetary integration.  
 
As part of the revitalization process, ECCAS launched a number of initiatives, including 
the Central African Energy Pool (PEAC) to coordinate energy issues; a plan to 
coordinate transport infrastructure; and the launching of a free trade area that would be 
established over 4 years (2004–07), leading to a single regional market in 2008 
(Awoumou 2008).  (However, this last objective has not yet been accomplished.)   
Another significant component of the revival was the establishment of mechanisms to 
manage regional conflicts.  In 2002, ECCAS members signed the protocol relating to the 
establishment of two new institutions:  a network of parliamentarians in Central Africa 
and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX).  COPAX entered into 
force in January  2004 to promote peace and security through two mechanisms: the 
Multinational Peace Keeping Force in Central Africa (FOMAC), and the Early Warning 
Observation and Monitoring System for Central Africa (MARAC).  Despite their formation, 
these mechanisms have not contributed to the reduction of the many conflicts in the 
ECCAS region. As a result, ECCAS has achieved little in the areas of its core mandate 
of regional economic integration and peace and security. Nonetheless, ECCAS has 
continued to receive international backing as the principal integration body in Central 
Africa (UNESCO 2006; Ikome 2009). 
 
The Role of External Actors in ECCAS 
Critics of ECCAS have charged that it exists largely because of donor funding rather 
than from internal legitimacy or efficacy.  Donors such as the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) have supported the ECCAS Secretariat in building its institutional capacity. The 
EU is also an important donor to ECCAS programs on peace and security. In 2006, a Institution Building for African Regionalism     |       13 
joint EU and ECCAS project was initiated to support the organization’s Department of 
Human Integration, Peace, Stability, and Security to fulfill its role of detection, prevention, 
and management of conflicts. The project supports MARAC with an early warning 
system to respond to regional crises. The other goal is to capacitate ECCAS to mediate 
conflicts and check the illicit proliferation of small arms, cross-border crime, and the 
illegal exploitation of the region’s natural resources (Awoumou 2008).  
 
The EU has exerted considerable leverage in Central Africa through the negotiations for 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) since October 2003.  Some members of 
ECCAS, as well as all CEMAC members, have been negotiating an EPA with the EU. 
The latter has also used these negotiations to press for the merger of CEMAC and 
ECCAS, with the prospect of transforming the Central Africa region into a free trade area 
in the future. The EU and other external actors have suggested a division of labor in 
which ECCAS would take more responsibility for peace and security, while CEMAC 
manages issues of trade and monetary integration.  But even though ECCAS and 
CEMAC signed a cooperation agreement in April 2005, they have continued to operate 
as parallel entities (UNECA 2002). 
 
3.2   The Economic Community of West African States  
 
Background  
West Africa is characterized by a multiplicity of regional institutions that were established 
during colonial rule and mirror the Anglophone–Francophone divide. Despite these 
divisions, Nigeria took a leadership role in 1975 to forge a consensus on the 
establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bridge 
the cultural and historical gaps in the region, while also establishing a comprehensive 
integration institution.  In 1993, ECOWAS revised its treaty to accelerate (i) integration 
and establishment of an economic and monetary union through the removal of customs 
duties for intra-ECOWAS trade and taxes having equivalent effect, (ii) the establishment 
of a common external tariff, (iii) the harmonization of economic and financial policies, 
and (iv) the creation of a single monetary zone. Unlike in the past when member states 
clung to their sovereignty, the revised treaty sought to postulate a measure of 
supranationalism for ECOWAS (ECOWAS 1993).  The revised treaty also had a strong 
focus on issues of peace and security, expanding the mandate beyond economics and 
trade issues. With the withdrawal of Mauritania in 1999, ECOWAS became a regional 
grouping of 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo. 
 
Objectives and Mandates 
Since its establishment, ECOWAS has tried to establish a common market through trade 
liberalization; uniform economic policies; the removal of trade barriers; and the free 
movement of people, goods, and services. In addition, ECOWAS has undertaken 
sectoral development programs in areas such as transport and communications, energy, 
and infrastructure development (ECOWAS 1993; Bach 2004). To support investment 
and promote financial cooperation, ECOWAS has established several institutions such 
as the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development (EFCCD) to 
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In recent years, EFCCD has been reconstituted as the ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID) along with two subsidiaries: the ECOWAS Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank (ERIB), which 
focus on public and private sector financing, respectively. The ECOWAS Bank Group 
(Ecobank) was also established to strengthen regional financial cooperation, with 
subsidiaries in 12 countries across West and Central Africa (ECOWAS 1993).  
 
ECOWAS Institutions 
The institutional design of ECOWAS is loosely modeled on the EU. Although not as 
elaborate, ECOWAS institutions are intended to play an important role in the 
implementation of joint cooperation programs.  The highest decision-making body of the 
community is the Authority of Heads of State and Government that is charged with 
directing and controlling the performance of the executive functions of ECOWAS. The 
Authority can adopt policies it regards as necessary and appropriate, and it can suspend 
a member state.  The other institutions include the Council of Ministers; Community 
Parliament; Economic and Social Council; Community Court of Justice; Executive 
Secretariat; Fund for Co-operation, Compensation, and Development; and Specialized 
Technical Commissions. The  ECOWAS treaty also makes provision for an Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), with an advisory role, to be composed of representatives 
of the “various categories of economic and social activity” (ECOWAS 1993).  To deal 
with questions of peace and security, the ECOWAS Summit in December 1999 agreed 
on a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, and Resolution, and Peace and Security.  
 
Typical of any organization with a heterogeneous membership, one of the initial 
challenges in ECOWAS was the slow pace of decision-making attributed to different 
national and economic outlooks. Moreover, the supreme organ has always been 
confronted with slow and cumbersome decision-making processes.  It was largely as a 
result of the institutional paralysis that had bedeviled ECOWAS that member states 
decided in 2005 to strengthen the capacity of the ECOWAS Secretariat. In transforming 
the Secretariat into an ECOWAS Commission headed by a President, ECOWAS hoped 
to create a more efficient institution to discharge its core functions. As part of these 
reforms, the members also established an ECOWAS Project Development and 
Implementation Unit (PDIU) to accelerate the realization of regional infrastructural 
projects in sectors such as energy, telecommunications, and transport (Osuntokun 
2004). 
 
Assessing Performance  
 
Trade liberalization 
The diversity of the economies in ECOWAS is critical to the assessment of progress in 
economic cooperation.  Intraregional trade among ECOWAS members accounts for less 
than 10% of members’ total trade, with the bulk conducted with extra-African partners. 
This is also because most members are protective of their domestic industries (Francis 
2001). Moreover, ECOWAS members are dependent on the export of primary 
agricultural commodities, with the exception of Nigeria and Sierra Leone, which export 
oil and diamonds, respectively, as their leading sources of foreign exchange. The 
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commodities.  Furthermore, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire, all depend on the 
export of cocoa as their main source of foreign exchange.  This homogeneity in 
production creates limited opportunities for intraregional trade, given the absence of a 
diversity of goods.   
 
Free Movement of People 
The ECOWAS treaty makes provisions for the free movement of goods, capital, and 
people toward the establishment of a functional subregional common market.  In 1979, 
ECOWAS adopted a protocol on the free movement of people that conferred upon 
ECOWAS members’ citizens the right to enter and reside in the territory of any member 
state provided they possessed valid travel documents. The protocol, however, also 
allowed member states the right to refuse admission to any ECOWAS citizens who were 
inadmissible under the member state’s own domestic laws. The supplementary protocols 
adopted between 1985 and 1990 committed member states to, among other things, (i) 
grant ECOWAS members’ citizens the right of residence for the purpose of seeking and 
carrying out income-earning employment; (ii) not expel ECOWAS citizens en masse; 
and (iii) limit the grounds for individual expulsion to reasons of national security, public 
order or morality, public health, or non-fulfillment of an essential condition of residence.  
These provisions have not been fully implemented by member countries. Thus, although 
the free movement of people is supposed to be enshrined in regional law, in reality, 
there are many impediments to mobility, including under-resourced immigration 
ministries and border control departments, the absence of systematic entry and exit 
recording systems, and the widespread seeking of bribes by border officials (Boulton 
2009).   
 
Conflict Management, Governance, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
ECOWAS took the first steps in subregional conflict management with the adoption of 
the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on 
Defense in 1981. Although ECOWAS did not initially have a provision for regional 
cooperation in political and defense matters, the escalation of conflicts and state 
collapse in the region forced it to make elaborate provisions for managing conflicts that 
were impeding regional integration programs. Despite the shortage of resources and 
capacity, ECOWAS made some positive contributions to restoring stability through its 
interventions in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea Bissau (1999).  In all 
these conflicts, Nigeria took a major leadership role (Adebajo 2008).  Since December 
1999, ECOWAS has adopted the comprehensive Mechanism for Conflict Prevention 
Management and Resolution Peacekeeping and Security as a permanent framework for 
managing security. A core part of this mechanism is the creation of the Council of the 
Wise, which intervenes in conflicts before they escalate.  In addition, ECOWAS adopted 
the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 and the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Governance and Human Rights, which seek to enhance human 
security and tackle issues of peace and security, democracy, good governance, and the 
rule of law. The community has also established the ECOWAS Parliament and the 
ECOWAS Court of Justice in Abuja, Nigeria (Akokpari 2009a).  
 
ECOWAS has made some attempts to contribute to the post-conflict reconstruction of 
the war ravaged states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and, to some 
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assistance toward post-conflict reconstruction has been largely limited to the promotion 
of post-conflict peace—for example, supporting the consolidation of electoral 
processes—rather than the rebuilding of infrastructure or the provision of funds to 
support governments’ institutional capacities (Francis 2009). 
 
Continuing Obstacles to ECOWAS Integration 
Asante made a trenchant critique of the ECOWAS integration process, noting that “the 
ECOWAS march towards West African economic cooperation and integration has been 
painfully slow, and no effective integration has taken place in ECOWAS—neither in trade 
nor production nor in laying foundations for economic transformation” (Asante 2000, 6). 
The progress realized in the areas mentioned above has demonstrated the persistence 
of the region to continue with the integration process despite the overwhelming odds, but 
many obstacles remain in translating declarations into concrete results that could benefit 
the region.  Like the rest of Africa, ECOWAS confronts the problem of overlapping and 
multiple memberships, in particular the existence of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA) that is made up of Francophone countries and has competed 
with ECOWAS.  UEMOA’s existence has been strongly linked to its membership ties 
with France, which is its main sources of finance; UEMOA members maintain a series of 
strong military and security ties with France.  In the past, France developed the 
reputation of seeking to check Nigeria’s attempts to forge economic and political 
cooperation between Francophone and Anglophone states in the region (Yansane 1977; 
Lavergne 1997). 
    
ECOWAS has similarly contended with the three-member Mano River Union (MRU), 
comprising Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  Although the MRU does not have the 
capacity of UEMOA to compete with ECOWAS, its existence as a parallel common 
market is a hindrance to integration.   
 
In addition to overlapping memberships, studies point to the fact that West African 
countries remain weakly integrated nationally and regionally. Nationally, most countries 
in the region suffer from weak transport and communications infrastructure, and other 
impediments to socioeconomic integration (Akokpari 2009b). At the regional level, West 
African countries continue to be divided by a wide range of institutional, legal, and 
infrastructural barriers that impede integration. Finally, despite its enormous contribution 
to providing leadership in peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and economic integration, 
Nigeria’s role in the region remains contested.  With the largest population and land area 
in ECOWAS, Nigeria is a dominant member of ECOWAS, a role that oftentimes creates 
resentments (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008; Arthur 2010).  
 
The Role of External Actors in ECOWAS 
ECOWAS has maintained diverse relations with multilateral and bilateral donors that 
provide economic assistance to its member states as well as funding for ECOWAS 
economic and security objectives.  Since it broadened its mandate to include security 
issues, ECOWAS has benefitted from assistance from the UN, EU, United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States (US) in its various intervention efforts in the region.  The 
EU’s relationship goes beyond capacity support to the ECOWAS security machinery. 
The EU is negotiating EPAs with ECOWAS. Relationships with external partners such as 
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security-related matters, the fight against terrorism, and organized trans-border and 
trans-regional criminal activities. 
 
3.3  The Community of Sahel-Saharan States  
 
Background 
The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was established in Tripoli, Libya in 
February 1998 through the initiative of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddaffi (CEN-SAD 
1993).  One of the major contributing factors to the creation of CEN-SAD was the 
political tensions between Morocco, its North African neighbors, and the OAU over 
recognition of Western Sahara in the 1990s. These tensions eventually paralyzed the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the major regional institution in North Africa. Gaddafi took 
advantage of this vacuum to launch his own institution by inviting Burkina Faso, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan into CEN-SAD (Sturman 2003; 
Brunel 2008a).  In February 2000, Senegal, Gambia, and Djibouti joined CEN-SAD.   
Libya has extended an open invitation to all African countries to join CEN-SAD in the 
future.  Thus far, the only real common ground that the member countries appear to 
share is the patronage of Libya that has contributed substantially to projects in member 
countries. During the OAU summit in 2000, CEN-SAD was recognized as one of the five 
regional pillars of African integration.  
 
Mandate and Objectives 
According to its architects, CEN-SAD seeks to work with other African regional 
institutions to strengthen peace, security, and stability, and to achieve global economic 
and social development (CEN-SAD 1993). As a framework for “integration and 
complementarity,” CEN-SAD has emphasized the attainment of economic unity among 
members through the implementation of the free movement of people and goods in 
order to eventually establish an FTA.  In addition, CEN-SAD has proposed strengthening 
integration by implementing common development plans in various sectors to 
complement members’ national development plans.  CEN-SAD’s common objectives 
include 
   
(i)  the removal of all restrictions hampering integration among member countries; 
 
(ii) free movement of persons, capital, and interests of nationals of member states; 
 
(iii) right of establishment, ownership, and exercise of economic activity; 
 
(iv)  free trade, movement of goods, commodities, and services originating from the 
signatory countries; 
 
(v) promotion of external trade through an investment policy in member states; and, 
 
(vi)    expand transport and communications among member states through the 




The supreme institution of CEN-SAD is the Conference of Heads of State, which sets 
community policies. The Conference meets once a year in an ordinary session 
(rotationally in the different capitals of member states) and the country hosting the 
summit presides over the Conference. It can also meet in an extraordinary session at the 
request of one or more member states.  Below the Conference is the Executive Council, 
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integration and the implementation of the decisions of the Conference.  CEN-SAD also 
has a Secretariat that is responsible for management of daily operations, monitoring the 
functioning of its institutions, and implementation of objectives.  
 
To enhance economic cooperation, CEN-SAD established the Sahel-Saharan 
Investment and Trade Bank in April 1999. The Bank was mandated to exercise all 
banking, financial, and commercial activities, including financing development projects 
and external trade.  Although the Bank’s operational priorities are to projects executed in 
member states, it can, upon the decision of its Board of Directors, open branches or 
offices within or outside the member countries.  Finally, CEN-SAD created the Economic 
and Social Council (ESCC), an advisory organ composed of 10 members designated by 
each member country that is mandated to assist the organs of CEN-SAD in the design 
and preparation of development programs (CEN-SAD 1993). 
 
In the peace and security arena, CEN-SAD has created the Sahel-Saharan Council for 
Peace and Security of the Community, as well as the Defense and Security Committee, 
to manage conflicts in the region. These institutions are the key to an incipient collective 
security within CEN-SAD articulated in the March 2003 Niamey Declaration on Conflict 
Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes that established the Mechanism for 
Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflicts.  Over the years, CEN-SAD has 
been unsuccessful in forming the Sahel-Saharan Council for Peace and Security, which 
was to be concerned with decisions on the Sahel-Saharan Intervention and 
Peacekeeping Force (AUC 2009).   
 
Assessing Performance 
As one of the newest RECs in Africa, CEN-SAD has not achieved its desired levels of 
economic cooperation. Moreover, since its members straddle several regional economic 
institutions, CEN-SAD has yet to develop a clear identity as a regional organization.  In 
an accurate assessment of the fledgling RECs, such as CEN-SAD and IGAD, the 
UNECA contends that the RECs main problem stems from the continual failure of 
member states to meet their financial obligations. Within CEN-SAD, membership dues 
are provided by Libya, subjecting the institution to the whims of a single country.  More 
important, the poor performance of CEN-SAD is largely attributable to the fact that 
member states are spread too thinly among many regional economic communities and 
may be motivated primarily by political and security, rather than economic, 
considerations ( AUC 2009).  
 
CEN-SAD is also a relative newcomer to the African political and security landscape.  In 
December 2001, 3 years after it was established, the organization sent a small 
peacekeeping force to the Central African Republic to assist in the restoration and 
enforcement of peace. However, given its limited experience with intervening in member 
states, the mission was short-lived and its efficiency was limited. In other areas, CEN-
SAD has worked with the AU to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as in 
Darfur. CEN-SAD is unique among African RECs in not having a charter on human 
rights, democracy, and good governance. Instead, the secretariat and summit meetings 
have often issued strident pronouncements against foreign interference in Africa. This 
posture dovetails with the Libyan dominance in CEN-SAD, which many people in Africa 
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The Role of External Actors in CEN-SAD 
CEN-SAD obtained observer status at the UN General Assembly in 2001 and concluded 
cooperation accords with the UNECA and other UN specialized agencies such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO); UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); and the Permanent Interstate 
Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel. It has also concluded partnership 
agreements with numerous regional and international organizations with the purpose of 
consolidating collective work in various political, cultural, economic, and social fields.  
Most of the cooperation arrangements have been assiduously promoted by Libya, the 
driving force of CEN-SAD. Since the rapprochement between Libya and Western 
countries in 2003, the EU has expanded political dialogue with Tripoli on issues such as 
the fight against terrorism, illegal migration across the Mediterranean Sea, energy, and 
peace and security.  Libya’s gradual engagement with Europe has entailed incorporating 
CEN-SAD into the areas of cooperation. For instance, on questions of illegal immigration, 
the EU has noted that “CEN-SAD members seem to have no real policy in that area” and 
that the Commission should take part in the organization’s meetings to “inform the CEN-
SAD countries about its policies and possibly assist them in the definition of their own 
migration policies” (European Commission 2009). Yet some members of CEN-SAD have 
complained that increasing collaboration between the EU and Libya on curbing illegal 
immigration through the establishment of reception camps and repatriation operations 
amounts to a “Libya First, CEN-SAD Second Policy” (EU Commission 2009). As stated 
above, political changes in Libya are likely to alter its role in African affairs. More than 
any other African institutions, CEN-SAD’s future hinges on whether Gaddaffi will survive 
the combined onslaught of rebel and international military pressures. 
 
3.4  The Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States  
 
Background 
The collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 created a vacuum among 
integration schemes in Eastern Africa. Composed of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the 
EAC had been a key player in regional integration since colonial times, but political 
differences led to its demise.  The ensuing vacuum was filled by a new institution, the 
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which was formed in 
1981 to boost commercial and economic cooperation. The membership of the PTA 
included Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. With the ultimate objective of forming a common market by 2000, the PTA 
pledged to gradually reduce and eliminate customs duties and non-tariff barriers. In 
advancing the objectives of coordinating trade integration, the PTA created a number of 
institutions, including the Trade and Development Bank for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
the PTA Clearing House, the PTA Traveler’s Checks, and the PTA Federation of 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Gibb 2006).  
 
In November 1993, PTA members ratified the treaty culminating in the birth of COMESA 
with the mandate to deepen integration from an FTA to a customs union.  In 1995, the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) extended an 
invitation to South Africa to join the organization, but South Africa rebuffed the offer.  20       |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 85 
Instead, South Africa was at the forefront of persuading SADC members to withdraw 
from COMESA to avoid the problem of overlapping membership. As a result, Angola, 
Tanzania, Lesotho, and Namibia withdrew from COMESA citing duplication of 
membership with SADC. Despite these withdrawals, COMESA gained new members 
when Egypt and Libya joined to make it the largest regional institution in Africa with 19 
members.   
 
Objectives and Mandates 
As outlined in its founding treaty, the vision of COMESA is to “be a fully integrated, 
internationally competitive regional economic community with high standards of living for 
all its people [and] ready to merge into an African Economic Community” (COMESA 
1993). The principal route for realizing this goal is developing integration through 
development of trade and investment. The primary mandates of COMESA are to    
 
(i)  promote the free movement of goods and services produced within COMESA, 
and remove all trade barriers and tariffs;   
(ii) establish a Customs Union under which goods and services imported from 
non-COMESA countries will attract an agreed single tariff in all COMESA 
countries; 
(iii) establish the free movement of capital and investment supported by adoption 
of a common investment area so as to create a more favorable investment 
climate for the region;  
(iv)  facilitate the gradual establishment of a payment union based on a COMESA 
clearing house and the eventual establishment of a common Monetary Union 
with a common currency;  and 
(v) adoption of common visa arrangements, including the right of establishment 
leading to the free movement of bona fide persons (COMESA 1993). 
 
With a population of about 416 million people (more than half the total population of 
Africa), COMESA sees itself as having a solid foundation to provide a huge market for 
member states in order to facilitate competitiveness within the region, increase intra-
regional trade, and attract more foreign investments. In advancing regional integration, 
12 COMESA member states established a free trade area in October 2000. This was 
followed by the establishment of a customs union in 2009. In addition, COMESA plans to 
have a monetary union by 2015 and a COMESA community by 2025. 
 
COMESA Institutions 
The institutional framework of COMESA consists of the following core organs: the 
Authority, Council of Ministers, Court of Justice, Secretariat, and Commission, plus 
specialized organs and committees. Consisting of heads of state and government, the 
Authority is the supreme decision-making body responsible for general policy direction, 
while the Council of Ministers monitors the activities of the regional bloc, approves the 
budget of the Court and the Secretariat, and recommends policy directions and 
development of initiatives. Appointed by the Authority, the Secretary-General is in 
charge of the administrative components of the COMESA Secretariat.  The Court of 
Justice was created to replace the PTA Tribunal, which has the powers to resolve 
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Common Market Law, an independent system of rules embodied in the COMESA treaty 
that is separate from and superior to national law (COMESA 2007). 
 
COMESA retained all the major economic institutions of the PTA—the Clearing House, 
Trade and Development Bank, Regional Investment Agency—and also created new 
ones such as the COMESA Fund, which seeks to cushion countries against the costs 
associated with trade liberalization, and the COMESA Trade and Documentation Centre.  
Since 2000, COMESA has been involved in conflict prevention and resolution through 
the establishment of a Committee on Peace and Security, which has worked to develop 
a peace and security structure for the organization. 
  
Assessing Performance 
Like its predecessor the PTA, COMESA has achieved modest successes in the 
promotion and diversification of intra-regional trade. Although the formation of the 
COMESA FTA in 2000 with a membership of 12 countries led to some increases in intra-
COMESA trade, the main challenge to the FTA has been the resurgence and 
proliferation of non-tariff barriers that still hamper trade among member states (Mistry 
2000). COMESA has made some progress in implementing transport programs that 
remove barriers to trade in the region; these programs have reduced transport costs and 
led to some increases in the volume of trade (UNECA 2002). In the COMESA Strategic 
Plan 2007–2010, members identified the obstacles to integration as being poverty, 
corruption, brain drain, dependence on developed countries for aid, high production 
costs, poor technological development, poor networking within the region, supply 
constraints, high debt servicing ratio, poor infrastructure development, low foreign direct 
investment, lack of policy harmonization, overlapping membership, inadequate human 
capital, and poor mobilization of resources (COMESA 2007).  
 
Despite these obstacles, COMESA reached a milestone in June 2009 when it launched 
a customs union.  Coming about a year behind schedule, the COMESA customs union 
aims at removing tariff barriers among member states and harmonizing barriers with 
third parties through the common external tariff (CET), which was adopted in May 2007.  
The COMESA CET stipulates that raw materials and capital goods should be imported 
into the customs union duty-free, while intermediate and finished goods should attract 
tariff rates of 10% and 25%, respectively.  Seen as an important step in economic 
integration, the customs union can potentially lead to more economic interactions among 
COMESA members and facilitate improved trade competitiveness within the bloc’s 
private sector.  To complement the customs union, COMESA established a payment and 
settlement system that will facilitate cross-border payments among central banks in the 
region. With these new mechanisms, COMESA estimates intraregional trade will reach 
US$20 billion by 2010 (Allafrica News 2009a).  
 
Prior to the customs union, another milestone was reached in the region when the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC heads of state met in Kampala, Uganda in October 2008 to 
explore measures to integrate the three subregions in Grand Free Trade Area stretching 
from Cape Town to Cairo.  With a combined population of nearly 600 million and annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) of US$1 trillion, the three subregions have committed to 
confront the perennial problem of overlapping and duplicative membership that 
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harmonization of trading arrangements among them, the free movement of business 
persons, joint implementation of interregional infrastructure programs, and interim 
institutional arrangements to spearhead the process of cooperation. With respect to 
trade arrangements, the summit agreed on measures to expedite an FTA encompassing 
the three blocs with the ultimate objective of establishing a single customs union. 
Pending the signing of a memorandum of understanding, the summit established a 
Tripartite Council of Ministers that will meet at least once every  2 years; Tripartite 
Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Trade, Finance, Customs, Economic Matters, and 
Home Affairs; Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Infrastructure; Tripartite 
Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Legal Affairs; Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials 
and of Experts that shall meet at least once a year; and Tripartite Task Force of the 
Secretariats of the three RECs to meet at least twice a year. The Tripartite Task Force 
was mandated to develop a road map for merger into a single REC (SADC-EAC-
COMESA 2008). During the 2
nd Tripartite Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 
2011, the COMESA-EAC-SADC heads of state agreed to launch negotiations for the 
establishment of Tripartite Free Trade Area for the 26 countries and “adopted a 
developmental approach to the Tripartite Integration that will  be anchored on 3 pillars 
namely: Market integration based on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA); Infrastructure 
Development to enhance connectivity and reduce costs of doing business as well as 
Industrial Development to address the capacity constraints,” (COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite Summit  2011). 
 
The Role of External Actors in COMESA 
The long-standing links between COMESA countries and Europe are being renegotiated 
within the rubric of the EPAs.  Given the diversity of the region, various groupings of 
countries are negotiating separate EPAs with the EU, including the Eastern and 
Southern African (ESA) EPA, East African Community (EAC) EPA, and SADC EPA 
(Braude 2008).  Since 2001, COMESA has collectively maintained a strategic 
partnership with the US. Technical support from the US has been useful to member 
states in the areas of information technologies; harmonizing regional policies on trade, 
agriculture, gender, and the environment; and food security.  In recent years, COMESA 
has also engaged the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in support of regional 
infrastructural projects.   
 
3.5  The Arab Maghreb Union 
 
Background 
Since the 1950s, the idea of an economic union in the Maghreb has animated North 
African nationalism.  In 1964, the first conference of Maghreb economic ministers was 
held in Tunis and produced the Conseil Permanent Consultativ du Maghreb (CPCM) 
between Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia to harmonize development plans, forge 
intraregional trade, and promote collective positions on relations with Europe (Zunes 
1995; Brunel 2008a).  But territorial disputes, political rivalries, and ideological 
differences stymied the realization of these objectives. The idea was revived in 1987 
following the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. In the first meeting of 
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in June 1988, the five Maghreb states 
appointed commissions to draft a treaty of cooperation. The treaty creating the AMU was 
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African and Arab countries, no new members have joined the organization since its 
inception.  
  
The formation of the AMU also coincided with efforts by the OAU to form an AEC 
through the Abuja Treaty. Seen as a pillar of African integration in North Africa, the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) nonetheless has not lived up to these expectations, primarily 
because of profound political differences and distrust among the five countries. Thus, 
even though designated as an REC, the AMU is yet to sign the  OAU Protocol on 
Relations between the AEC and RECs. Because of its dormancy and ineffectiveness, 
the AMU has increasingly been overshadowed by the Libyan-led CEN-SAD. With the 
civil war that has convulsed Libya since February 2011, it is, however, likely that CEN-
SAD will diminish in significance, potentially swinging the pendulum back to the AMU. 
 
Mandate and Objectives 
The AMU’s treaty pledged to strengthen relations among member states to guarantee 
regional stability and enhance policy coordination. In addition, the treaty highlighted the 
importance of developing agriculture, industry, commerce, food security, and the setting 
up of joint projects and economic cooperation programs.  It also pledged to gradually 
introduce the free circulation of goods, services, and factors of production among the 
member states as a precursor to the creation of a North African Common Market or the 
Maghreb Economic Space. The final objective of the AMU was to enable its members to 
bargain with the EU over a whole range of economic issues (AMU 1988; Brunel 2008b). 
 
AMU Institutions 
Like most African RECs, the supreme institutional organ that makes decisions in the 
AMU is the Council of Heads of State.  According to the treaty, the Council was to meet 
twice a year; however, this was changed to once a year in 1993.  Algeria nominally 
chaired the Council for many years until 2005 when Libya was supposed to take over, 
but immediately relinquished the position. The AMU has not met at the level of heads 
of state since April 1994, a fact that has effectively paralyzed the organization.  Below 
the heads of state level is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which is supposed 
to meet regularly to prepare for the sessions of the heads of state and examine 
proposals formulated by four specialized ministerial commissions on the economy and 
finance, human resources, basic infrastructure, and food security.  Although the 
Council of Ministers holds regular meetings, it has not had an impact because of the 
paralysis at the presidential level (Zunes 1995). Similarly, the AMU Secretariat is based 
in Rabat, Morocco, but its role is perfunctory. The AMU treaty also envisaged a 
Consultative Assembly, consisting of 30 representatives from each member state that 
would advise the Council of Heads of State and a Court of Justice comprising two 
judges from each member state.  But like all of the AMU’s institutions, these organs 
exist in name only. 
 
Assessing Performance 
At the heart of the AMU’s paralysis are regional differences over the status of Western 
Sahara, which was annexed by Morocco in 1975 but still retains the support of Algeria.  
Since the conflict started, the land borders between Morocco and Algeria have been 
closed, even though relations between the two have improved since the formation of the 
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the OAU in 1982 and has not made attempts to join the AU. Finally, Libya’s engagement 
with CEN-SAD created an alternative framework that diminished the significance of the 
AMU, but this may change with the demise of Gaddaffi.  
 
Conclusions and Lessons for Asia 
Comparing the experiences of African regional institutions reveals sharp differences in 
efforts to forge meaningful integration.  These differences are, in part, shaped by the 
past legacies, leadership, and motives behind integration.  The structural problems of 
underdevelopment, external orientation of primarily agricultural economies, and 
inadequate infrastructure for trade and investment remain salient in explaining the 
inability of these institutions to achieve the objectives of integration.  Overall, African 
regionalism has remained at the level of cooperation and has barely advanced toward 
supra-nationalism. Even though institutions such as ECOWAS have proposed more 
coordination of economic and security issues to foster shared sovereignty, the dominant 
pattern of African regionalism is cooperation in limited areas that can command 
consensus. The disproportionate power accorded to heads of state underscores Africa’s 
desire to retain a significant measure of sovereignty with regard to questions of 
integration.  
 
The integrative forces of small economies and markets impel African regionalism, but 
the disintegrative dynamics of weak states that characterize most African countries have 
checked the emergence of solid patterns of integration along functional lines.  As a result, 
the dominant pattern since the 1960s has been that most of the regional institutions 
have played primarily political, rather than economic, roles; this is why most African 
regional institutions have overlapping memberships that defy economic logic. The 
tendency to join many institutions is driven by the past legacy in which heads of state 
sought to enhance their image and stature through forays in foreign affairs, including 
membership in regional institutions. CEN-SAD partly epitomizes this tendency whereby 
Libya has tried to erect an institution to promote its foreign policy objectives. The 
process of rationalizing African regional institutions, however, is beginning to occur with 
mounting pressures from the EU for EPAs that reflect economic convergence more than 
political motives.  Moreover, the experiment of a potential merger involving the EAC, 
SADC, and COMESA presents interesting vistas in Africa’s collective efforts to build 
more sound institutions anchored on economic logic. The contemplated merger has the 
potential of transforming the pattern of regionalism in Africa in the direction that 
architects of the Pan-Africanist continental economic community have always articulated.  
Nonetheless, it will take a long time before there is clarity on the seriousness of these 
efforts.       
 
While political motives prevail in most regional institutions, there is a growing trend within 
some African RECs to move in the direction of trade creation, foreign investment, and 
collaboration to boost transport and infrastructure development.  Institutions such as 
COMESA have persisted in creating new institutions that may potentially begin to make 
a difference in promoting intraregional trade and attracting external investments. In 
addition, despite its problems, ECOWAS has persisted in creating the institutional 
foundations—particularly in infrastructure, energy, and banking—that may be significant 
to the future elaboration of strong regionalism. Most of Africa’s regional institutions are 
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customs unions, which may in the long run contribute to strengthening regional 
integration.   
 
Unlike ECOWAS and COMESA, which have both fostered a semblance of being 
functional regional institutions, the AMU and ECCAS symbolize the profound difficulty of 
constructing institutions against the backdrop of conflicts and dissensions.  Throughout 
Africa, strong regional institutions have emerged where interstate conflicts have been 
minimized and addressed, and where the regional institutions have become incipient 
instruments of collective security. Although the AU remains the most comprehensive 
institution of African security, the growing roles of regional institutions signifies the 
priority accorded to regional stability as the prerequisite for economic cooperation. 
 
Africa has succeeded in resolving the tensions between continentalism and 
subregionalism by delineating the roles between the AU and regional institutions.  The 
new structures and institutions embodied in the AU and regional institutions have 
attempted to rebuild the division of labor between security and economic roles in 
integration that existed in the first 3 decades of African independence when the OAU 
dealt primarily with political and security matters, while the subregional organizations 
focused on economic concerns.  But regional institutions will continue to play central 
security functions, given their roles in the creation of the ASF and other security 
initiatives. Similarly, the AU, through the UNECA, has persistently pushed to be 
recognized as a leader in continental integration through the AEC. In the future, a much 
stronger AU that provides leadership in economic and security domains may gradually 
evolve more functional, fruitful, and realistic relationships with regional institutions based 
on complementarities rather than competitiveness. Its leadership, however, hinges on a 
resolution of the questions about the structure of the AU, the shape and timing of 
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     Institution Building for African Regionalism
Regionalism in Africa has entailed the search for collective efforts to overcome political 
fragmentation and economic weaknesses.  This study is a synoptic analysis of how African 
countries have constructed institutions for security and prosperity. These efforts are captured 
through actors and events animating African regionalism since independence. The author 
suggests that while regional integration remains critical in Africa, unresolved tensions 
between continental and sub-regional institutions have impeded the emergence of stable 
forms of regionalism.
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